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A life policy is not regarded as a mere contract of indemnity: Id.
The omission of a person whose life is insured to make any statement
in respect to any particular habit, not called for by any general or specific
question put to him, will-not be such a concealment as to avoid the policy.
It is sufficient if he answers truly all the questions put to' him, without
evasion or concealment: Id.
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The recent decision, in the Exchequer Chamber, of the case of
Webb vs. Bird, 8 Jur. N. S. 621, affirming the decision of the
Court of Common Pleas, 10 0.B. N. S.269, has presented one
point in the law of easements in somewhat of a novel aspect. It
appeared, in this case, that the plaintiff was the owner of a windmill, built in 1829, and that the owners of the mill had from that
period, down to 1859, enjoyed, as of right, without interruption
or molestation, the benefit of the current of air from the west for
working his mill. In that year and 1860, the defendant built a
school-house within twenty-five yards of the plaintiff's mill, and
thereby obstructed the plaintiff's mill, by hindering the currents
of air which would otherwise have come to it from the west,
whereby the value and use of the mill had become materially
deteriorated.
The early reports contain some dicta in regard to the right of
the owner of a windmill to enjoy the free and unobstructed access
of the air to his mill. In 16 Vin. Ab. Nuisance, G. pl. 19, WINCH,
J., is reported to have said, " That where one erected a house so
high that the wind was stopped from the windmill in Finsbury
Fields, it was adjudged that the house should be broken down."
The same principle is declared in 2 Roll. Ab. 704. See also
Goodman vs. Gore, Godb. 189.
In the case of Webb vs. Bird,in the Common Bench, WILLES, J.,
took a distinction between mills where the lord of the manor may
compel all the residents within the manor to grind at his mill, and
ordinary mills, where no such prescriptive right exists, and argued
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that the early cases in regard to windmills might be explainable
on some such grounds. The Exchequer Chamber- did not regard
these old cases as being of much authority in regard to the question before them, being very briefly reported and amounting to
little more than dicta.
That court held, that the time of prescriptive right not existing
in the case, and no presumption of grant arising, inasmuch as such
presumption could only arise from long-continued enjoyment, where
the person against whom the claim is asserted might have interposed to prevent or hinder the exercise of the right claimed, which,
it would be idle to pretend, could have been done in any case like
the present, without resort to such expensive complications as to
bring in question the entire sanity of the person resorting to any
such expedients, for any such purpose, it could not be fairly said
the plaintiffs had acquired any such interest in the currents of air,
as to maintain an action for their obstruction. Moore vs. Bawson,
3 B. & Cr. 332, 339; Chasemore vs. Bichards, 7 Ho. Lds. Cas.
849, 370.
The decision of the English courts, in regard to this novel
question, is highly commended in a leading article in. the London
Jurist, August 9, 1862, for its consonance with good sense and
sound judgment. We should certainly not feel disposed to dissent
from this comment, and we -will add that, in our judgment, the law
of England, in regard to presumptive rights growing out of uninterrupted use, has been very imperfectly comprehended, and very
poorly set forth in many of the decisions and much of the judicial
and juridical commentary, produced upon this side of the Atlantic.
As we have here no strictly prescriptive rights, and very little
upon which to base any presumption of grant, in regard to merely
incorporeal interests, it is not wonderful that we should meet some
indefiniteness of application in regard to questions involved in
such inquiries. We have, therefore, presented this brief outline
of the decision of Webb vs. Bird, inasmuch as it tends very clearly
to illustrate the true basis of all presumption of grant growing out
of mere use, without obstruction or contradiction, viz., the acquiescence of the adversary in such use.
I. F. R..

